1

EU (EUROPEAN UNION) UPDATES

February 2026 featured several legislative and policy developments, including climate, sustainability, cybersecurity, migration, and sanctions measures:

·        Climate and Sustainability: On February 25, the EU Council adopted a regulation setting a binding 2040 climate target (90% emissions reduction under the European Climate Law). The Council also approved the Corporate Sustainability Reporting Directive and Corporate Sustainability Due Diligence Directive on February 24. A new directive on stricter monitoring of substances in surface and groundwater was signed off. The Commission adopted rules on disclosing information about discarded unsold consumer products (under the Ecodesign for Sustainable Products Regulation).

·        Cybersecurity and Security: The NIS Cooperation Group adopted an ICT Supply Chain Security Toolbox on February 13. The Commission published a ProtectEU counter-terrorism strategy (February 26) and advanced work on a counter-drone action plan and action plan against cyberbullying. A Submarine Cable Security Toolbox was also released.

·        Migration: On February 10, the European Parliament approved reforms extending the "safe third country" concept and creating a European list of safe countries of origin (including Bangladesh, Tunisia, Morocco, Kosovo, Colombia, Egypt, and India), allowing accelerated asylum procedures and returns without a prior connection to the country.

·        Other: Updates to the list of non-cooperative tax jurisdictions; proposals for digitalizing product compliance and AI rules (Digital Omnibus); and the 20th sanctions package against Russia (proposed early February, with adoption pending). The EU-Singapore Digital Trade Agreement entered into force on February 1. Discussions continued on trade deals and competitiveness.

Overall, February was relatively quiet for new EU law applications compared to January, with about 74 planned changes (many related to sanctions expirations or agriculture deadlines).

2

ASEAN UPDATES

The Philippines assumed the 2026 ASEAN Chairmanship under the theme “Navigating Our Future, Together” (priorities: Peace and Security Anchors, Prosperity Corridors, People Empowerment). Key February activities included:

·        Early meetings, such as the ASEAN foreign ministers' retreat in Cebu focusing on regional security, stability, and unity amid geopolitical challenges. Preparatory meetings for the 48th/49th ASEAN Summits were later scaled back (some moved online) per presidential directive.

·        Publication of the ASEAN Digital Financial Literacy Core Competency Framework (developed with the OECD).

·        Commemoration of the 50th anniversary of the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia (TAC) on February 24.

·        Ongoing work on the ASEAN Digital Economy Framework Agreement (DEFA, targeted for conclusion in 2026) and sustainable finance initiatives (e.g., ASEAN Taxonomy Version 4 consultation). Concerns were expressed over Middle East conflicts (late February escalations).

·        Progress toward an ASEAN-Canada FTA (negotiations advancing, targeting possible 2026-2027 conclusion).

ASEAN also noted Timor-Leste's recent full membership and continued emphasis on the Five-Point Consensus for Myanmar.

3

APEC (ASIA-PACIFIC ECONOMIC COOPERATION) UPDATES

China hosted the APEC "China Year" in 2026 under the theme “Building an Asia-Pacific Community to Prosper Together” (priorities: openness, innovation, cooperation).

·        The First Senior Officials’ Meeting (SOM) and related meetings took place in Guangzhou from February 1–10, officially launching the year's agenda. Over 1,000 delegates attended. Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi outlined goals, including advancing the Free Trade Area of the Asia-Pacific and connectivity upgrades. The Leaders' Meeting is scheduled for November in Shenzhen.

·        Release of the February 2026 APEC Regional Trends Analysis (ARTA), noting improved near-term growth momentum (projected ~3.1% for the region in 2026) amid global uncertainties, with emphasis on resilient supply chains and innovation.

An official website for APEC China 2026 was launched around this time.

4

NAFTA (now USMCA) UPDATES

NAFTA was replaced by the USMCA (US – Mexico- CAnada) in 2020.

February 2026 updates centered on preparations for the mandatory six-year joint review (starting July 1, 2026), which will assess the agreement's operation and decide on extension (potentially for another 16 years), revisions, or other outcomes:

·        Ongoing bilateral negotiations between the U.S., Mexico, and Canada (influenced by tariff discussions and the second Trump administration). The U.S. signaled interest in changes rather than straightforward renewal.

·        Stakeholder consultations, public comments, and congressional briefings continued from late 2025 into early 2026. Industry input focused on rules of origin, labor/environmental enforcement, customs procedures, and competitiveness.

·        Broader context included U.S. tariff actions (e.g., post-Supreme Court rulings on certain tariffs in February, with exemptions for USMCA-compliant goods in some cases) and analyses of North American trade resilience.

The review process is not a full renegotiation but offers opportunities for adjustments. No final decisions were made in February.

5

UNITED NATIONS (UN) UPDATES

Main UN Bodies

·        UN80 Initiative & Humanitarian Reform: On 27 February, the General Assembly received a briefing on the UN80 Initiative (a system-wide reform to make the UN more effective). Key focuses included a New Humanitarian Compact for streamlining aid delivery and proposals for merging some training/research bodies. Under-Secretary-General Guy Ryder highlighted progress and challenges over the past year.

·        General Assembly:

o   On 24 February (fourth anniversary of Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine), the GA resumed its 11th emergency special session and adopted a resolution titled “Support for lasting peace in Ukraine” (107 in favour, 12 against, 51 abstentions). It reaffirmed Ukraine’s sovereignty, territorial integrity, and called for an immediate ceasefire, prisoner exchanges, and return of civilians/children. The US attempted (unsuccessfully) to remove references to territorial integrity.

o   Other GA activity included briefings on the Global Compact for Migration (27 February) and appointments (e.g., Joint Inspection Unit members).

·        Security Council:

o   The UK held the presidency for February.

o   Focus areas included the situation in Sudan (120-day briefing), the Middle East (including Palestinian question, multiple meetings), South Sudan, and protection of civilians.

o   One resolution adopted: Extension of the mandate of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team (related to Taliban sanctions).

o   Briefings covered Ukraine, Syria, Central African Republic, and peacekeeping police components.

·        Secretary-General & Broader Themes:

o   António Guterres repeatedly condemned civilian attacks in Ukraine and expressed deep concern over escalating violence in Sudan (North Darfur) and border tensions (e.g., Afghanistan-Pakistan).

o   On 23 February, at the opening of the Human Rights Council’s 61st session in Geneva, Guterres warned that the “rule of force” was outmuscled human rights globally, citing blatant violations in Palestine and the use of AI/technologies against rights. He urged the Council to resist geopolitical pressures.

o   Concerns raised on humanitarian crises in South Sudan, Afghanistan (returnees facing hardship), Cuba (fuel shortages/sanctions), Madagascar (cyclones), and Niger/Chad response plans.

o   Financial warnings persisted about potential UN “imminent financial collapse” due to unpaid assessments and budget rules.

·        Human Rights Office (OHCHR): Launched a USD 400 million appeal for 2026 to address global needs amid funding crises. Issued warnings on possible ethnic cleansing risks in Gaza/West Bank and deepening crises in Cuba and Ethiopia’s Tigray region.

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UN - SPECIALIZED AGENCIES & RELATED ENTITIES- UPDATES

UNICEF:

·        Held its First regular session of the Executive Board (10–13 February), discussing humanitarian action priorities amid resource constraints, the humanitarian reset, and UN80 Initiative.

·        Warned about school closures in Ukraine due to the war (even far from frontlines) and ongoing restrictions on girls’ education in Afghanistan (in coordination with UNESCO).

UNHCR (Refugee Agency): Highlighted the plight of 5.4 million Afghan returnees facing winter hardship and worsening conditions. Contributed to the Global Appeal 2026 planning (released around late 2025 but active in February discussions).

Human Rights Council (HRC): 61st session opened on 23 February (running into March). High-level segment featured statements from Guterres, High Commissioner Volker Türk, and others. Discussions included Sudan (genocidal risks in El Fasher), South Sudan, and global human rights trends.

Other Mentions:

• UNESCO/UNICEF: Continued advocacy on education rights, including in Afghanistan and joint events (e.g., International Day of Education follow-up in January, with echoes in February).
• WMO/Weather-Related: Hosted the “Weather and Society” Conference (23–26 February), focusing on hydrometeorological events and societal impacts.
• Daily/regular briefings addressed topics like organized crime and toxic waste pollution, Ramadan messages, and AI ethics.

7

WTO (WORLD TRADE ORGANISATION) UPDATES

Activity centered on preparatory work ahead of the 14th Ministerial Conference (MC14), scheduled for 26–29/30 March 2026 in Yaoundé, Cameroon. Discussions focused on WTO reform, agriculture, trade facilitation, environment, and support for small/vulnerable economies.

Preparations for MC14

·        Members worked intensively on draft texts and proposals for potential adoption or further negotiation at MC14.

·        On 17 February, WTO members endorsed a draft ministerial decision (submitted by the Group of Small, Vulnerable Economies – SVEs) to boost small economies’ participation in the multilateral trading system. The text calls for better integration into digital trade, mapping challenges in logistics/connectivity/border processes, and promoting trade facilitation/digital tools. This was the first draft decision submitted for MC14 approval.

·        Agriculture negotiations: On 27 February, the Special Session of the Committee on Agriculture discussed a new draft ministerial decision introduced by Argentina, along with eight other submissions circulated since December 2025. Members provided feedback; the Chair later circulated a revised text as a basis for further talks.

·        WTO Reform: Discussions advanced on modernization, including governance, fairness/level playing field, and “issues of our time.” Director-General Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala publicly supported calls for reform of the global trading system, aligning with U.S. signals while urging members to act rather than “lament” policy shifts (e.g., tariffs). She emphasized making the system more robust amid geopolitical changes.

Committee and Technical Meetings

·        25 February – Committee on Trade Facilitation: Members advanced work on the second review of the Trade Facilitation Agreement (TFA) (due in 2026), discussed technical assistance coordination, and held experience-sharing sessions.

·        26 February – Committee on Trade and Environment (CTE): Took stock of progress on the trade-and-environment nexus, with emphasis on trade and climate measures, including enhanced transparency.

·        16 February: Informal discussions on fossil fuel subsidy reform, with members exploring new approaches and sharing experiences.

·        Intellectual Property (TRIPS): Colombia circulated a proposal to extend the moratorium on non-violation and situation complaints until MC15.

8

THIRD WORLD DEMANDS – UPDATES

Here are the key updates from February 2026 related to demands from the Third World (commonly referred to today as the Global South, developing countries, Least Developed Countries (LDCs), the G77+China, the African Group, or the G90 group of developing WTO members). These demands centered on WTO reform, trade rules favoring development, agriculture, special and differential treatment (S&DT), and broader UN/systemic issues. February served as a preparatory period ahead of the WTO's 14th Ministerial Conference (MC14 in Yaoundé, Cameroon, late March 2026).

WTO and Trade-Related Demands

Developing countries and the African Group actively pushed for a development-centered WTO reform to address historical imbalances from the Uruguay Round and the stalled Doha Development Agenda. Key themes included:

·        WTO Reform Priorities: Reform must be member-driven, inclusive, transparent, and development-centered. It should correct inequities, preserve core principles (e.g., non-discrimination, consensus), restore a fully functioning dispute settlement system (including the Appellate Body), and avoid entrenching asymmetries or unilateralism. Developing countries emphasized that the system has failed to deliver equitable outcomes and must respond to structural concerns of the Global South.

·        Special and Differential Treatment (S&DT): Strong calls to preserve and strengthen S&DT provisions, which provide flexibility, longer implementation periods, and support for developing countries and LDCs to industrialize, diversify exports, and integrate into global value chains. Proposals from the G90 focused on specific areas like sanitary/phytosanitary measures, technical barriers to trade, and technology transfer under TRIPS Article 66.2.

·        Agriculture: The African Group set out detailed priorities, including food security, rural livelihoods, and protections against distortive subsidies. Negotiations aimed at substantive outcomes rather than minimal declarations. Developing countries resisted marginalization of agriculture in the agenda.

·        Small and Vulnerable Economies (SVEs): On 17 February, WTO members endorsed a draft ministerial decision (proposed by SVEs) to improve integration of small economies into the multilateral system, focusing on digital trade, logistics, connectivity, and trade facilitation.

·        LDC-Specific Issues: Calls for an LDC package, including extensions of flexibilities post-graduation (in subsidies, TRIPS, agriculture), full implementation of past decisions, technology transfer, and support via the Enhanced Integrated Framework. Concerns were raised about compressed agendas at MC14 limiting meaningful discussion on LDC graduation, remittances, and related topics.

The Maputo Ministerial Declaration (issued by African trade ministers on 26 February 2026) formalized many of these positions, reaffirming solidarity with Cameroon as MC14 host and stressing Africa's role as the largest WTO constituency.

Broader analyses (e.g., from UNCTAD and South Centre) in February highlighted the need for WTO rules to support South-South trade, policy space for industrialization, and resilience amid global uncertainties.

UN and Broader Systemic Demands

·        Group of 77 (G77+China): On 3 February, the G77 strongly protested sharp funding cuts for South-South Cooperation (via the UN Office for South-South Cooperation – UNOSSC). They viewed this as undermining collective self-reliance and development efforts among the 134+ member states.

·        Investment and Development: Emphasis on channeling resources into sustainable investment, green industrialization, and AfCFTA linkages rather than traditional aid models. African leaders (e.g., at related forums) stressed "investment, not aid" for transformation.

·        Climate and Just Transition: Indirect but related calls for fair, affordable transitions away from fossil fuels, with support for Global South countries (e.g., via dedicated platforms for dialogue, finance, and technology). Developing countries sought to ensure transitions do not exacerbate vulnerabilities or impose new burdens.

Other Contextual Notes

• Procedural Concerns: The South Centre (a think tank supporting the Global South) released notes in February critiquing MC14 modalities, warning that overloaded or compressed sessions (e.g., single "Development including LDC issues" slot) could sideline longstanding proposals and limit participation by countries with smaller delegations.
• Civil Society Echoes: Groups like La Via Campesina and others aligned with Third World perspectives began mobilizing against perceived WTO biases in agriculture and food policies, though major actions intensified closer to MC14.
• Cross-Cutting Themes: Demands repeatedly stressed making multilateralism responsive to contemporary challenges (geopolitics, climate, digital economy) while prioritizing the needs of LDCs, small economies, and Africa. South-South cooperation and regional integration (e.g., AfCFTA) were positioned as complements to WTO engagement.

February 2026 activity was largely preparatory and agenda-setting, with concrete draft texts and declarations building momentum for MC14. No major breakthroughs occurred that month, but the unified voice from the African Group, G77, G90, and LDC coordinators highlighted persistent calls for a more equitable global trading and development architecture.

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GLOBALISATION - UPDATES

Impacts of Globalization on the World Economy

Analyses in February portrayed globalization as disrupted rather than ended, with mixed effects amid resilience and headwinds:

·        Resilience Amid Slowing Growth and Trade Uncertainty: Global GDP growth was projected to moderate in 2026 (around 2.7–3.0%, varying by source), down from stronger 2025 performance. Trade volumes showed resilience (e.g., goods import growth at 5.3% y/y in late 2025 data), but forward indicators pointed to divergence: strong in parts of Asia (excluding China) and EMDEs, offset by contractions elsewhere (e.g., US imports). Commodity prices rose sharply in January (energy and metals up due to geopolitics and weather), with volatility persisting.

·        Negative Pressures from Deglobalization Trends: Several reports identified deglobalization (or slowbalization) as a structural drag on growth. US tariffs, export restrictions (e.g., chips), EU protectionism, and friend-shoring fragmented markets, raising transaction costs, reducing economies of scale, and weakening efficiency in resource allocation. This led to concentrated production, foreign capital withdrawal in some areas, and subdued investment. Analysts like ANBOUND argued it was the root cause of slowdowns, beyond cyclical factors, imposing sustained downward pressure on global welfare.

·        Uneven Winners and Losers: UNCTAD’s Global Trade Update (released February 12) examined shifting trade policies, noting losses for some exporters but new opportunities for others in a more restrictive landscape. Supply chains were rewiring toward resilience and security over pure cost efficiency, with regional clustering increasing. Geopolitical tensions (e.g., Middle East, Ukraine echoes) and tariff uncertainty added volatility, while AI and technology offered counterbalancing productivity gains in some sectors.

·        Broader Effects: Economic shocks became more synchronized globally due to interconnected supply chains, reducing the importance of physical distance in some transmission mechanisms. However, benefits like poverty reduction and living standards gains in developing countries were uneven, with vulnerabilities exposed in small/LDC economies. Public debt, inflation moderation (around 3%), and labor market softness were noted alongside these shifts.

Overall, the consensus was that the global economy remained resilient to 2025 tariff shocks but faced heightened risks in 2026 from policy uncertainty, energy prices, and fragmentation.

Emerging Alternative Suggestions

February saw growing discourse on moving beyond traditional globalization toward adaptive models. Key themes included reglobalization, regionalization, and South-South cooperation as pragmatic responses:

• Reglobalization and Regional Ecosystems: The World Economic Forum and others described a transition to “reglobalization,” where trade, production, and finance realign around resilience, security, and strategic concerns rather than pure efficiency. This involved more multinodal, regionally clustered networks (e.g., friend-shoring, nearshoring) while maintaining global scale. AI-powered supply chains were highlighted as enabling smarter, more intelligence-driven regional ecosystems, accelerating this shift without fully dismantling connectivity.

• South-South Cooperation and Global South Voices: The Group of 77+China protested funding cuts to UN South-South Cooperation mechanisms (UNOSSC), viewing them as undermining self-reliance among developing countries. Interventions (e.g., South Centre seminar on 24 February) emphasized equity, rule-of-law, inclusiveness, and coordinated action in global governance. Proposals focused on strengthening South-South ties for industrialization, technology transfer, and alternatives to traditional aid/models, including via BRICS, AfCFTA linkages, and initiatives like China’s Hainan Free Trade Port as a model of “measured openness” within geoeconomic boundaries.

• WTO Reform and Plurilateral/Development-Focused Approaches: Ahead of MC14 (March 2026), discussions stressed development-centered reform—preserving Special and Differential Treatment (S&DT), supporting small/vulnerable economies (draft decision endorsed 17 February on digital trade integration and trade facilitation), and addressing agriculture/food security for the Global South. Calls emerged for plurilateral initiatives, coalitions of the willing in trade, and better integration of regional agreements (e.g., AfCFTA) with multilateral rules. Business groups (e.g., ICC) urged time-bound reform and renewal of the e-commerce moratorium.

• Other Ideas: Academic and policy forums explored multipolar globalization (overlapping spheres with different standards), coalitions for governance reform (e.g., calls for papers on alternative coalitions including South-South and climate-focused groups), and context-specific democracy/development models in the Global South to counter inequalities. Some highlighted “localized, controllable openness” as a third path between full globalization and protectionism.

These alternatives emphasized balancing openness with sovereignty, resilience, and equity—often prioritizing regional integration, South-led initiatives, and reformed institutions over unrestricted hyper-globalization.

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TRANSNATIONAL ACTORS OF GLOBAL IMPORTANCE - UPDATES

Here are the key updates from February 2026 on the activities of transnational actors of global importance. These include influential non-state or hybrid entities such as global think tanks and forums (e.g., World Economic Forum), major philanthropic organizations (e.g., Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation), large multinational corporations/tech giants, international NGOs/civil society networks, and business-oriented coalitions.

World Economic Forum (WEF) and Related Global Forums

·        Leadership Transition and Fallout: In February 2026, WEF President and CEO Børge Brende resigned amid scrutiny over his past relationship with Jeffrey Epstein. The organization launched an internal investigation. This followed the 56th Annual Meeting (Davos, January 19–23, 2026), which had focused on themes like cooperation in a contested world, new growth sources, responsible innovation, and prosperity within planetary boundaries.

·        Publications and Ongoing Influence: The WEF continued releasing or promoting key reports from late January/early 2026, including the Global Risks Report 2026 (highlighting geoeconomic confrontation, AI risks, multipolarity without strong multilateralism, and societal polarization). Other outputs included insights on the new nature economy, sports for people and planet, and the Global Cooperation Barometer 2026. These shaped discussions on global economic resilience, AI governance, and fragmented cooperation.

·        Side Events and Partnerships: WEF-linked or parallel activities included the Digital Platforms Summit 2026 (February 25, Brussels), discussing the EU's Digital Markets Act and Digital Fairness Act, with participation from tech leaders and regulators. WEF also influenced broader dialogues on energy transition and sustainability.

Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation (Major Philanthropic Actor)

·        Historic Budget and Strategic Shift: The foundation publicly detailed its record $9 billion annual payout for 2026 (announced earlier but emphasized in February), as part of a plan to spend an additional $200 billion before closing operations in 2045. This included budget increases for global health, women's health, AI in education, and smallholder farmer adaptation to climate change.

·        Annual Letter and Initiatives: On February 3, CEO Mark Suzman released the 2026 Annual Letter ("The Road to 2045"), warning of the first reversal in global health progress in a generation due to funding cuts. It outlined a 20-year roadmap focusing on three goals: saving/improving lives, reducing inequities, and accelerating innovation. Key announcements included the Horizon1000 partnership with OpenAI (initial $50 million commitment) to deploy AI tools in African primary health clinics, starting in Rwanda, plus continued support for polio eradication, TB vaccine trials (e.g., M72 in South Africa), HIV drugs, and nitrogen-fixing crops for African farmers.

·        Broader Impact: The foundation positioned itself as a counter to declining official development assistance, emphasizing private-sector partnerships and AI for health/development in the Global South.

Security and Geopolitical Dialogues (Munich Security Conference Ecosystem)

• MSC Kick-off and Related Events (early February, Berlin): The Munich Security Conference (MSC) held its traditional kick-off event (February 10) with ~250 high-level attendees from politics, business, diplomacy, media, and academia. Discussions centered on global conflicts, the "age of destruction over reform," and the role of powerful actors (including references to US policy shifts under Trump). Side events by Foreign Policy magazine included the Emerging Threats Forum (February 14) and health-security dialogues on pandemic preparedness, involving industry leaders, civil society, and policymakers.

• Transnational Business/Security Actors: Multinational corporations and think tanks participated in panels on transatlantic strains, multipolarity, and strategic realignment. The Military Balance 2026 report by the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) was launched around February 24, analyzing global military capabilities and economic underpinnings.

Other Transnational Business, Tech, and Civil Society Actors

• Multinational Corporations and CEO Sentiment: The Conference Board's CEO Confidence Index (surveyed February 3–16, released February 26) showed a surge to 59 in Q1 2026 (up 11 points), reflecting improved industry expectations amid resilience to prior tariff shocks and policy uncertainty. Tech giants (e.g., OpenAI, Microsoft, Google, Meta) featured prominently in AI-related discussions, including regulatory tensions and energy demands for data centers.

• BRICS-Related Business and Youth Networks: Under India's 2026 BRICS chairship, the first BRICS Sherpas/Sous-Sherpas meeting occurred February 9–10 in New Delhi, focusing on "Building for Resilience, Innovation, Cooperation and Sustainability." This included the first BRICS Youth Coordination Meeting, involving youth representatives from member countries to advance people-centric initiatives. Business forums and media networks (e.g., MediaLab BRICS) supported parallel engagement.

• NGOs and Civil Society: On February 27 (World NGO Day), the EU's Special Representative for Human Rights issued a statement emphasizing the role of NGOs in building resilient societies. Broader civil society actors engaged in sustainability forums, such as the Asia-Pacific Forum on Sustainable Development (February 24–27, Bangkok), involving UN bodies, states, and non-state stakeholders feeding into the 2026 High-Level Political Forum.

• AI and Tech Governance Actors: Preparations advanced for India's AI Impact Summit (February 19–20, New Delhi), the first in the Global South, focusing on inclusive, culturally grounded AI governance with participation from tech companies, governments, and civil society.

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DEMOCRACY AND HUMAN RIGHTS – UPDATES

Major Reports Highlighting Violations and Democratic Decline

·        Human Rights Watch (HRW) World Report 2026 (released early February, with ongoing commentary): The report warned that the global human rights system is in “peril”, with 72% of the world’s population living under autocracy — a level not seen since around 1985. It described a “democratic recession” accelerated by leaders in the US (Trump administration), China, and Russia, who share “open disdain for norms” and wield significant power to undermine the rules-based order. Specific concerns included assaults on US democratic pillars, suppression of dissent, and broader global backsliding. HRW called for rights-respecting democracies to form a strategic alliance to push back.

·        V-Dem Institute Democracy Report 2026 (data covering up to 2025, discussed in February–March): It documented the “Third Wave of Autocratization,” with electoral autocracy as the most populous regime type (nearly half the world’s population). New autocratizers emerged, including several European countries. Media censorship and repression of civil society remained common tactics. The report noted dramatic declines, including in the USA (described as the most rapid “executive aggrandizement” in modern history).

·        Freedom House Freedom in the World 2026 (released around late February/early March, with previews in February): Global freedom declined for the 20th consecutive year in 2025. 54 countries saw deterioration in political rights and civil liberties, versus only 35 improvements. It highlighted the “growing shadow of autocracy,” including organized collaboration among authoritarian states and notable declines even in traditionally free countries like the US.

NGOs like CIVICUS and the International Bar Association also raised alarms about shrinking civic space, repression of activists, and violations in conflict zones.

UN Human Rights Council (HRC) 61st Session (Opened 23 February)

·        Opening and High-Level Segment: UN Secretary-General António Guterres delivered what was expected to be one of his final addresses to the Council, warning that “human rights are under a full-scale attack” globally. He described the “rule of force” outmuscling the rule of law, with violations unfolding in plain sight amid geopolitical competition. Guterres urged the Council to resist political expediency, protect the vulnerable, and prevent erosion of rights from becoming normalized. High Commissioner Volker Türk and representatives from over 120 states participated.

·        Key Themes and Resolutions: The session addressed conflicts (Ukraine, Syria, Sudan, Palestine/Middle East), rights of the child in armed conflict, human rights defenders, freedom of expression, mental health, and the right to food/housing. It adopted 38 resolutions (many by consensus), extending mandates on country situations. Discussions included atrocity prevention priorities and the impact of digital technologies. However, analysts noted limitations, including challenges in addressing new Middle East escalations (e.g., US-Israel actions against Iran starting late February) due to competing urgent debates and accusations of double standards.

·        Civic Space and Civil Society Input: Groups like CIVICUS highlighted global erosion of civic space and repression, urging stronger Council action.

Actions on Ukraine and Broader Conflicts

·        On 24 February (fourth anniversary of Russia’s invasion), the UN General Assembly resumed its 11th emergency special session and adopted a resolution titled “Support for lasting peace in Ukraine” (107 in favour, 12 against, 51 abstentions). It reaffirmed Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity, called for an immediate ceasefire, prisoner exchanges, and return of deported civilians/children. The US attempted (unsuccessfully) to remove references to territorial integrity. The resolution condemned human rights and humanitarian violations linked to the conflict.

·        Continued work on accountability mechanisms for violations in Ukraine (e.g., Commission of Inquiry findings on war crimes and crimes against humanity, including child deportations).

Other Consensus-Building and Restoration Efforts

·        Guterres’ Broader Calls: Throughout February, the Secretary-General emphasized that human rights are essential to progress, not obstacles, and urged a “rights-rooted” approach to peace, justice, and sustainable development. He warned against letting power rewrite rules that sideline the vulnerable.

·        China’s Position (via Foreign Minister Wang Yi at the HRC high-level segment): Stressed that human rights should not be used as an “ornament for democracy” or cover for hegemonism, advocating non-interference and equal application of international law.

·        Civil Society and Think Tank Actions: Open letters on atrocity prevention, side events on just transitions/climate and rights, and calls for renewed multilateral commitment. Reports like Amnesty International’s work on authoritarian practices (including in the US) fed into February discussions.

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ENVIRONMENT- UPDATES

Ongoing Environmental Crises and Scientific Warnings

·        Record Temperatures: February 2026 ranked as the fifth-warmest February on record globally (NOAA, Copernicus, and other analyses), with global surface temperatures about 1.18°C above the 20th-century average. Ocean temperatures remained exceptionally warm (second-warmest on record in some datasets), despite the absence of a strong El Niño. Long-term trends continued to show intensified risks from extreme weather, heatwaves, and ecosystem stress.

·        WEF Global Risks Report 2026 (released/emphasized early February): Environmental risks remained among the most severe long-term threats (10-year horizon), with extreme weather, biodiversity loss/ecosystem collapse, and critical changes to Earth systems ranking high. However, they slipped in short-term (2-year) perceived urgency due to immediate geopolitical and economic pressures. The report highlighted interconnected risks, including how climate instability could exacerbate societal polarization and economic downturns.

·        IPBES Biodiversity and Business Report (launched ~9 February): Warned that biodiversity loss poses a systemic risk to the global economy and financial stability. It urged companies to undertake “transformative change,” set ambitious targets, and shift away from nature-harming investments (noting $7.3 trillion annually flows to harmful activities). The assessment, approved by over 150 governments, is expected to influence policymaking across sectors.

·        Pollution and Chemicals: Discussions at Geneva events noted a 50-fold increase in chemical production since 1950 (projected to triple by 2050), contributing to millions of deaths annually from pollution exposure. Disinformation was flagged as undermining evidence-based action on the triple crisis.

Broader analyses (e.g., UNCTAD World Economic Situation and Prospects) linked climate shocks to uneven growth, particularly in vulnerable developing economies, with calls for scaled-up multilateral finance and coordination.

Global Consensus and Mitigation Actions

·        Plastic Pollution Treaty Negotiations (INC-5.3): A one-day resumed session occurred on 7 February in Geneva (CICG). It focused on organizational matters, including electing a new Chair (Julio Cordano of Chile) after the previous chair’s resignation. No substantive negotiations took place, but it kept momentum toward a legally binding instrument. Regional consultations preceded the session.

·        Chemicals, Waste, and Pollution Panel (ISP-CWP P1): The first plenary session of the Intergovernmental Science-Policy Panel ran 2–6 February in Geneva, aiming to strengthen science-policy interfaces for better management of chemicals and pollution.

·        Biodiversity Implementation (CBD SBI-6):  The 6th meeting of the Subsidiary Body on Implementation took place 16–19 February in Rome. It addressed resource mobilization, national reporting for the Kunming-Montreal Global Biodiversity Framework (GBF), and preparation for COP17 (later in 2026). Capacity and funding gaps for developing countries were highlighted, especially for national reports feeding into the global review of GBF progress.

·        UNFCCC and Climate Capacity Building: On 19 February, UN Climate Change launched a new Capacity-Building for Negotiators initiative. African Least Developed Countries (LDCs) prepared for the first-ever centralized review of transparency reports (scheduled in Rwanda). UN Climate Chief emphasized a “new era of climate action” for stability in an unstable world.

·        Asia-Pacific Forum on Sustainable Development (APFSD-13): Held 24–27 February in Bangkok under the theme “Transformative, equitable, innovative and coordinated actions for the 2030 Agenda.” It reviewed progress on SDGs 6 (water/sanitation), 7 (clean energy), 9 (industry/infrastructure), 11 (sustainable cities), and 17 (partnerships), with strong focus on climate-water-energy linkages, land subsidence, and just transitions. It fed into the 2026 High-Level Political Forum.

·        Other Events: World Wetlands Day (2 February) highlighted traditional knowledge for wetland conservation. IPCC workshops on diverse knowledge systems and assessment methods occurred around 10 February. Africa’s Green Economy Summit (late February in Cape Town) and India’s World Sustainable Development Summit (25–27 February, New Delhi) emphasized regional green transitions and multistakeholder solutions.

Policy and Regional Actions

·        European Union: On 24 February, the EU Council approved simplifications to sustainability reporting (CSRD) and due diligence (CSDDD) requirements to boost competitiveness. This included raising thresholds (exempting many smaller firms), delaying timelines, and easing some obligations (e.g., dropping mandatory climate transition plans under CSDDD for certain scopes). Earlier in the month, the European Parliament advanced the 2040 climate target framework (90% net emissions reduction). These moves balanced ambition with economic pressures but drew criticism for weakening corporate accountability.

·        Business and Finance: UNEP’s State of Finance for Nature 2026 (discussed in related contexts) called for redirecting finance from harmful to nature-positive investments, noting high returns from nature-based solutions.

13

GENDER JUSTICE – UPDATES

Global Gender Justice Movements and Backlash

·        UN Women and Civil Society Mobilization: UN Women issued a media advisory on 25 February highlighting that women and girls were “never closer to equality, and never closer to losing it.” It stressed defending rights against rising conflict, repression, and political tensions weakening the rule of law. Activists and NGOs (e.g., CIVICUS, International Council of Women) called for dismantling discriminatory laws, harmful norms, and impunity in justice systems. The International Council of Women released a statement on 16 February urging full implementation of the Beijing Platform for Action and CEDAW, zero tolerance for gender-based violence, and stronger women’s leadership.

·        Young Feminist Leadership: The CSW70 Virtual Youth Forum (“Beyond Access: Justice, Power & Young Feminist Leadership”) took place on 20–21 February (online, with interpretation). Organized with youth-led and feminist groups (including Young Feminist Caucus, UNFPA, and others), it focused on how justice, power, and leadership shape diverse young women’s lives.

·        Protest at Rio de Janeiro, Brazil (February 14, 2026): Members of the feminist collective Puta Davida (which advocates for the labor and human rights of sex workers) participated in a march during Carnival in downtown Rio. The action highlighted the recognition of sex work as legitimate labor and called for better protection of sex workers' human and labor rights. This was documented in photo essays and reports covering bold women standing up for justice.

·        Broader Context: Reports and opinion pieces (e.g., Global Issues on 17 February) noted persistent global gender gaps, with no country achieving full equality. Discrimination, violence, and barriers in education, employment, health, and safety remained widespread. Feminist resistance grew against interlocking crises, including anti-gender movements and funding cuts.

Gender Discrimination in International Relations and Foreign Policy

·        US Policy Shifts: The US State Department finalized a rule (effective 26 February) titled “Combating Gender Ideology in Foreign Assistance.” It restricted use of US foreign aid to promote “gender ideology,” with requirements for segregated accounts and alignment with administration policy opposing certain equity and reproductive rights elements. Critics viewed this as a reversal of prior bipartisan commitments to women’s equality in foreign policy, impacting UN work, NGOs, and multilateral institutions.

·        Country-Specific Examples:

o   Sweden: Its February foreign policy statement reaffirmed gender equality as a core value and human rights priority in UN engagement and development assistance.

o   Australia: Human Rights Watch submissions urged integrating women’s rights more deeply into foreign policy, including feminist foreign policy elements and broader asylum pathways.

o   Europe/Central Asia: Discussions on the 25th anniversary of the Women, Peace and Security (WPS) agenda highlighted feminist foreign policy potential and gaps in the humanitarian-development-peace nexus.

·        Women, Peace and Security (WPS): The Georgetown Institute for Women, Peace and Security released its February Conflict Tracker, documenting discrimination and exclusion of women in peace processes (e.g., Gaza, Colombia, Iran protests, Philippines BARMM elections). It noted women’s frontline roles in protests (e.g., Iran’s Woman, Life, Freedom movement) but risks of sidelining their demands.

Global Consensus and Actions to Ensure Gender Justice

·        UN Human Rights Mechanisms: On 17 February, the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) issued a statement warning of funding crises threatening its work and broader backlash (one in four countries experiencing regression). It stressed women’s rights as essential for peace, sustainable development, and economic growth, urging maximum participation of women on equal terms.

·        World Day of Social Justice (20 February): Observed under themes like “Renewed Commitment to Social Development and Social Justice” and “Empowering Inclusion: Bridging Gaps for Social Justice.” Events (e.g., webinars on SRHR as a social justice issue) linked gender equality to poverty reduction, informal economy transitions, and inclusive digital/green economies.

·        UN Women Executive Board: On 18 February, Executive Director Sima Bahous addressed the first regular session, outlining a new Strategic Plan for 2026 amid crises, funding pressures, and the need to defend equality.

·        Preparations for CSW70 and IWD: Focus built around access to justice as the priority theme (eliminating discriminatory laws, promoting equitable legal systems, addressing structural barriers). A high-level meeting on violence against women and girls was planned. UN Women prepared a report (launched early March) on failing protection systems

14

TERRORISM – UPDATES

Major Terrorist Incidents and Threats in February 2026

Terrorism remained active, with a focus on ISIL affiliates, jihadist groups in Africa/South Asia, and far-right extremism:

·        Nigeria (3–4 February): Hundreds of extremist militants (linked to IS-affiliated Lakurawa) attacked two villages in Kwara State (Nuku and Woro) after locals rejected their version of Sharia law. Reports indicate 162–200+ deaths and over 50 injuries in mass shootings.

·        Pakistan (6 February): A suicide bombing (person-borne IED) at the Khadija Tul Kubra Mosque in Islamabad’s Tarlai Kalan area killed 32 people and injured ~170 during Friday prayers. Islamic State – Pakistan Province claimed responsibility.

·        Earlier, on January 31, attacks in Balochistan killed 48 people (including 31 civilians), for which the Balochistan Liberation Army (BLA) claimed responsibility. The UN issued formal condemnations for both events in early February.

·        Russia (7 February): A mass stabbing at Bashkir State Medical University in Ufa injured 6 (+1 attacker). The attacker was reportedly a supporter of a neo-Nazi/white power group designated as terrorist by Russia.

·        Ukraine (22 February): Bombings in Lviv killed 1 (a police officer) and injured 14.

Broader Trends:

·        ISIL/Da’esh showed resilience and adaptation, with intensifying multipolar threats in Africa (Sahel, West Africa, Lake Chad Basin), the Middle East, and beyond. A mass escape of over 20,000 from detention facilities holding IS-linked individuals heightened risks. IS announced a “new phase of operations” in Syria late in the month.

·        Far-right/extremist violence: ~18 incidents worldwide (highest in the US), often involving incitement or trials.

·        Afghanistan-Pakistan border militant activity contributed to escalating open conflict, including Pakistani airstrikes.

·        Sahel Dominance: The Sahel region now accounts for over 50% of global terrorism deaths, with Nigeria seeing the sharpest increase in IS-affiliated activity.

·        Technological Shift: Insurgent groups like FARC dissidents and the ELN in Colombia have fully integrated drone warfare, recording 77 drone-based attacks in the preceding year, signaling a new era of "lo-fi" aerial threats.

·        Western Radicalization: While 99% of terror deaths occur in conflict zones, deaths in the West rose by 280% in the last year, largely driven by "lone actor" attacks and extreme right-wing or jihadist-inspired youth radicalization

The late-February joint US-Israeli military operation against Iran (starting ~28 February) was widely assessed as greatly escalating future terrorism risks, including potential proxy/ asymmetric responses.

Global Consensus and Actions Against Terrorism/ insurgency/ extremism

·       UN Security Council (4 February): Briefing on the Secretary-General’s 22nd strategic-level report on ISIL/Da’esh. Acting Under-Secretary-General Alexandre Zouev (UNOCT) and CTED Executive Director Natalia Gherman highlighted the group’s growing, complex threat despite counter-efforts. Emphasis on nationally owned prevention, human rights-compliant approaches, root causes, and repatriation from Syrian detention camps. The UK chaired the session.

·        FATF Financial Crackdown: During the February 2026 Plenary, the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) updated its lists to curb terror financing:

·        Blacklist: Iran, North Korea, and Myanmar remain under the highest level of financial restrictions.

·        Grey List: Kuwait and Papua New Guinea were newly added due to strategic deficiencies in their anti-money laundering and counter-terrorist financing (AML/CFT) frameworks

·        EU ProtectEU Counter-Terrorism Agenda (26 February): The European Commission launched a new agenda under the ProtectEU Internal Security Strategy. It focuses on six pillars: anticipating threats (intelligence-sharing, AI/crypto/drones), preventing radicalisation (especially among minors and online), protecting people/public spaces/critical infrastructure, operational response, and international cooperation. It aims to address evolving threats like digital radicalisation and emerging technologies.

·        UN Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy: The Secretary-General submitted a progress report to the General Assembly in February ahead of the ninth review (negotiations starting March, with a high-level conference planned for June/July 2026). Discussions stressed balancing security with human rights, rule of law, and addressing new/emerging technologies. The EU-UN held their 7th Dialogue on Counter-Terrorism in New York (5 February).

·        International Day for the Prevention of Violent Extremism (around mid-February): Marked with a press conference by Alexandre Zouev, focusing on preventing violent extremism in the age of new/emerging technologies.

15

NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION – UPDATES

Major Developments: End of New START

New START expired on 5 February 2026: This treaty had imposed verifiable limits on US and Russian deployed strategic nuclear warheads, delivery systems, and provided data exchanges and inspections. Its lapse marked the first time in decades with no legally binding caps on the two largest nuclear arsenals.

·        Russia had offered (in 2025) to mutually observe the numerical limits for another year; the US (under the Trump administration) showed initial interest but ultimately did not accept a simple extension, preferring a broader deal that could include China.

·        Analysts warned of increased unpredictability, worst-case planning, and potential arms race dynamics, especially with China's ongoing nuclear expansion (projected to reach ~1,000 warheads by 2030).

·        Calls emerged for voluntary compliance with prior limits, resumption of verification measures, or new negotiations. No immediate replacement agreement was reached.

This development amplified broader fears of eroding arms control and weakening the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) regime ahead of its 2026 Review Conference.

Iran Nuclear Program

·        IAEA Report (released 27 February 2026): The Director General's report on Iran's NPT Safeguards Agreement highlighted ongoing challenges, including limited access and verification issues. It noted Iran's enriched uranium stockpile details and the impact of prior strikes/damage to facilities. Inspections occurred at some locations (e.g., Karaj Waste Storage), but full cooperation remained constrained.

·        Diplomatic Efforts: Indirect US-Iran talks continued in Geneva (mediated by Oman), with rounds around 17 and 26 February. IAEA Director General Rafael Grossi participated, providing technical advice on verification. Iran signaled a possible "historic" agreement was within reach but rejected certain conditions. Tensions persisted over enrichment limits and stockpile management.

·        Military Context: Late February saw escalating rhetoric and eventual US-Israel coordinated strikes on Iran (beginning ~28 February), targeting military infrastructure, nuclear-related sites, and leadership in an effort to degrade capabilities and prevent weaponization. This followed earlier 2025 strikes and added urgency to proliferation concerns.

Iran remained the focal point of proliferation worries, with debates on whether it might exit the NPT or accelerate toward weapons capability.

Other Proliferation Concerns

·        North Korea: No major nuclear tests or significant proliferation events were reported in February 2026. Missile and weapons testing activity was limited that month (more prominent in other periods), but ongoing modernization of its arsenal continued to raise regional risks.

·        Broader Trends: Discussions highlighted rising interest in nuclear options among some US allies (due to doubts over extended deterrence), modernization by all nuclear powers, and potential "cascade" proliferation risks if the NPT weakens further. China's expansion and emerging technologies (e.g., AI in command systems) added complexity.

Global Consensus and Actions

·        NPT Preparations: Work advanced for the 2026 NPT Review Conference (April–May in New York). Informal consultations and working papers from groups (e.g., Vienna Group of Ten, Non-Aligned Movement) emphasized strengthening safeguards, disarmament obligations (Article VI), and peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Concerns grew that the New START expiration could undermine credibility and lead to a contentious or failed conference.

·        UN and Multilateral Efforts: The IAEA continued safeguards implementation and reporting. UN Security Council briefings and documents stressed non-proliferation norms. Broader calls (from think tanks, NGOs like ICAN, and states) urged renewed dialogue, verification revival, and preventing an arms race. No new binding resolutions or treaties were adopted.

·        Challenges to Consensus: Divisions persisted between nuclear-weapon states and non-nuclear states over disarmament progress vs. non-proliferation priorities. Geopolitical tensions (Ukraine, Middle East) complicated unified action. Analysts described 2026 as a pivotal year, with risks of NPT erosion if arms control remains stalled.

16

GLOBAL POWER POLITICS – UPDATES

1. Expiration of the New START Treaty (5 February 2026)

The last major bilateral nuclear arms control agreement between the US and Russia expired on 5 February, removing verifiable limits on deployed strategic nuclear warheads, missiles, and bombers for the first time since the 1970s.

• US position (Trump administration): Trump rejected a simple Russian offer to extend limits informally and pushed for a "better, modernized" multilateral deal that would include China and cover all Russian warheads (including non-strategic/tactical ones). The US emphasized bringing China into talks to address its expanding arsenal.
• Russia's response: Moscow expressed regret but stated it was open to diplomacy while warning it would "resolutely counter any new threats." It accused the US of undermining strategic stability.
• China's stance: Beijing called the expiration "regrettable" and urged the US to resume dialogue with Russia on strategic stability, while maintaining it would not join bilateral US-Russia talks (citing its smaller arsenal and no-first-use policy).

This event heightened fears of a new tri-polar nuclear arms race (US-Russia-China) amid worst-case planning and reduced transparency. It set the stage for broader erosion of the arms control regime ahead of the 2026 NPT Review Conference.

2. US-Russia-China Nuclear Arms Control Talks (Geneva, late February)

On 23 February, the US met a Russian delegation in Geneva for talks on a potential new multilateral nuclear arms control framework. A meeting with a Chinese delegation followed the next day.

These talks represented Washington's attempt to shift from bilateral (US-Russia) to trilateral arrangements, reflecting Trump's transactional approach: leverage negotiations to cap Chinese growth while managing Russian capabilities. Progress was limited, with deep divisions over scope, verification, and inclusion of non-strategic weapons.

3. Escalation to Direct US-Israeli Military Strikes on Iran (Starting 28 February)

In the most dramatic display of US power projection, the United States and Israel launched coordinated airstrikes on Iran on 28 February (Operation Epic Fury / Roaring Lion), targeting military sites, nuclear-related infrastructure, missile programs, and leadership. The strikes resulted in the killing of Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei and other senior officials, with significant civilian casualties reported.

·        US/Israeli objectives (per statements): Prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons, dismantle its missile and naval capabilities, weaken the "Axis of Resistance," and induce regime change. Trump framed it as protecting core US national security interests and called on Iranians to rise against the regime.

·        Iran's response: Iran launched retaliatory strikes on US bases, Israel, and regional targets, disrupting oil shipments and causing regional instability.

·        Russia & China reactions: Both condemned the strikes as aggression and violations of international law. They positioned themselves as voices of restraint, with China emphasizing diplomatic solutions and criticizing the escalation amid ongoing nuclear talks. This further strained US-Russia/China relations and highlighted competing visions of Middle East order.

The late-February strikes marked a sharp escalation in US Middle East policy and raised global risks of wider conflict, including potential disruptions to energy markets.

4. US-China High-Level Engagements and Tensions

·        Trump-Xi phone call (early February): The leaders discussed trade (e.g., US soybeans), the Russia-Ukraine war, and Iran. Xi reportedly pressed Trump on reducing US support for Taiwan, shortly after a major US arms package to Taipei.

·        Broader dynamics: The Trump administration sought "stable relations" with China but maintained deep distrust, continuing elements of the trade war while exploring selective cooperation. China portrayed 2026 as a "big year" for bilateral ties but used the platform to critique US unilateralism.

These interactions underscored a pragmatic yet competitive US-China relationship, with economic leverage and Taiwan remaining flashpoints.

5. Russia-Ukraine War Dynamics and US Pressure

·        Ongoing US-brokered talks aimed at a peace deal, with Washington pressing Ukraine on territorial concessions and warning against strikes that could hit US interests (e.g., after Ukrainian attacks on Russian ports).

·        Russia intensified infrastructure protection and warned of risks of direct nuclear-power clashes. Putin ordered stepped-up security for energy and transport assets.

·        This reflected Trump's "America First" approach: reducing US entanglement while using leverage on both sides, often at the expense of European allies' preferences.

Broader Context and Power Politics Themes

February 2026 illustrated a shift toward transactional multipolarity:

·        US under Trump pursued aggressive, deal-oriented policies — ending old arms control pacts, direct military action in the Middle East, and pressure on allies/adversaries alike.

·        Russia and China cooperated closely on strategic issues (e.g., nuclear stability rhetoric) while exploiting perceived US overreach or alliance strains.

·        Other powers (e.g., Europe, Gulf states) navigated the fallout, with concerns over energy security, nuclear risks, and reduced multilateral guardrails.