The most recent bilateral nuclear arms control treaty between the United States and Russia, “NEW START” expired on 5 February, ending verifiable limits on deployed strategic nuclear warheads, missiles, and bombers for the first time since the 1970s.
WHAT IS “NEW START”?
New START is the successor bilateral treaty between the United States and the Russian Federation, formally titled the Treaty between the United States of America and the Russian Federation on Measures for the Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms. It renewed and simplified limits after the earlier Moscow Treaty (SORT) and the lapse of START‑I
· Signed on 8 April 2010 in Prague by U.S. President Barack Obama and Russian President Dmitry Medvedev.
· Entered into force on 5 February 2011 and was originally set for 10 years, with a provision for a single five‑year extension, which both sides agreed to in February 2021, pushing the expiry to 5 February 2026
New START was negotiated in the broader context of:
· Easing post‑Cold War mistrust and preserving at least minimal verifiable limits on the world’s two largest nuclear arsenals after START‑I lapsed in 2009 and the Moscow Treaty (SORT) had weak verification.
· Efforts toward a “nuclear‑free world” that Obama promoted in his 2009 Prague speech; the treaty was framed as a step toward deeper reductions and a possible follow‑on agreement, possibly including other nuclear‑armed states.
Core provisions of New START
· Limits on deployed strategic nuclear warheads (up to 1,550 each), and on strategic nuclear delivery systems (ICBMs, SLBMs, heavy bombers), capped at 700 deployed and 800 total launchers and bombers.
· A robust inspection and data‑exchange regime: regular on‑site inspections, notifications of force changes, and transparency measures to verify that each side stays within the ceilings.
Expiration of New START in February 2026
· New START expired on 5 February 2026 and, by treaty text, cannot be extended again, so the clock ran out without a formal successor deal.
· This expiry marks the first time since the 1970s that there is no legally binding treaty limiting U.S. and Russian strategic‑offensive nuclear forces, though both sides have signaled they may continue to “observe” some limits informally.
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WHAT WAS START?
START (Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty) refers to the START I treaty, signed in 1991 between the United States and the Soviet Union. It was the first major treaty to actually reduce instead of just cap strategic nuclear weapons, limiting deployed warheads to about 6,000 and launchers to 1,600 and establishing intrusive verification (on‑site inspections, telemetry sharing). · Signed on 31 July 1991 by U.S. President George H. W. Bush and Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev. · Entered into force on 5 December 1994 after the Soviet Union’s breakup; the Lisbon Protocol bound Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine as successor states.
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US POSITION
The US wants China included in any successor to New START (or a new trilateral arms control framework) primarily because China’s nuclear arsenal is expanding rapidly and unconstrained, making a purely bilateral US-Russia treaty outdated in a multipolar nuclear environment.
New START (signed 2010, extended to February 5, 2026) limited the US and Russia to 1,550 deployed strategic warheads and 700 deployed strategic delivery systems each, with verification. It expired without renewal or extension. US officials (under the Trump administration, including Secretary of State Marco Rubio and Under Secretary Thomas DiNanno) argue that ignoring China would leave the US and allies less secure. China’s stockpile grew from ~200-250 warheads around 2020 to over 600 today and is projected to reach 1,000+ by 2030 (per US assessments).
Beijing’s buildup is described as “deliberate, rapid, and opaque,” with no transparency, declarations, or limits—unlike the US-Russia framework. A bilateral deal would impose unilateral constraints on the US while China (and Russia’s new systems) faces none, risking a “two nuclear peer” problem where the US must deter both Russia and China simultaneously.
The US seeks a “better,” modernized agreement that covers all Russian warheads (not just deployed strategic ones), includes China, and reflects 21st-century realities. Trump has called New START obsolete and pushed for talks involving China to avoid an unchecked arms race
RUSSIAN POSITION
Russia has prioritized bilateral US-Russia talks and views US insistence on China as complicating or stalling progress. In September 2025, President Vladimir Putin offered to voluntarily observe New START’s central numerical limits for one year post-expiration (until Feb 2027), provided the US reciprocates and avoids steps that “undermine the strategic balance” (e.g., expanding missile defenses or space-based interceptors). The US did not formally accept this before expiration; Russia expressed regret but said it would act responsibly per its national interests and continue abiding by limits unilaterally for now (as it claims to have done even after suspending participation in 2023 over Ukraine-related issues).
Russia regrets the treaty’s lapse and supports strategic stability dialogue with the US. It has conducted joint strategic stability talks with China but has not strongly advocated for trilateral negotiations. Moscow sees the US-China linkage as a potential “poison pill” and prefers focusing on bilateral issues first. Russia remains open to new talks but ties any deal to reciprocity and US restraint on issues like missile defense.
CHINESE POSITION
China has consistently and firmly refused to join trilateral (or any formal) nuclear arms control negotiations with the US and Russia “at this stage.” Its nuclear capabilities are “not comparable in scale” (hundreds of warheads vs. thousands for the US/Russia), so demanding its participation is “unreasonable,” “unrealistic,” “neither fair nor reasonable.” Beijing maintains a minimum deterrence posture (no-first-use, self-defense only) and argues that the two largest nuclear powers (US and Russia) must first make “drastic and substantive reductions” in their arsenals in a verifiable, irreversible, legally binding way before China engages. It has hinted it might consider talks only if US/Russia reduce to roughly China’s level—a condition it knows is unrealistic.
China regrets New START’s expiration and urged the US to respond positively to Russia’s one-year voluntary compliance proposal to preserve global strategic stability. It supports continued US-Russia bilateral limits but rejects being brought into the framework prematurely. China has participated in some multilateral or bilateral risk-reduction dialogues but draws a hard line against quantitative arms limits or transparency measures on its forces for now.
REACTION OF UN AND OTHER MULTILATERAL BODIES
UN Secretary-General António Guterres described the expiration as a "grave moment" for international peace and security. He highlighted that, for the first time in over 50 years, there are no binding limits on the strategic nuclear arsenals of the US and Russia. He warned of elevated risks of nuclear use amid rising geopolitical tensions and urged responsible handling to avoid undermining global stability.
Non-nuclear-weapon states (under the NPT) are expected to criticize it strongly at the upcoming NPT Review Conference as a failure of the nuclear powers to fulfill Article VI obligations on disarmament and ending the arms race. Arms control groups like ICAN echoed this, stressing that the end increases risks of nuclear escalation and arms racing, while reminding all nuclear states of their ongoing legal duty to pursue disarmament.
REACTION OF EUROPE AND NATO ALLIES
European reactions were few and largely muted in official channels, despite Europe being a major beneficiary of the treaty's predictability and caps (given its proximity to Russia).
· Analysts and think tanks (e.g., SIPRI, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists) warned of increased dangers for European security, strategic stability, and proliferation risks. They urged Europe to step up with its own initiatives: risk-reduction measures (e.g., better crisis communication, exercise notifications), pressing the US for renewed talks, and having France/UK signal openness to future multilateral processes involving China and Russia.
· Some short official remarks stressed the need for restraint and echoed US calls for China to show restraint or join talks. Discussions in countries like Germany, Poland, and Denmark touched on broader nuclear deterrence questions (including "European nuclear deterrence" ideas with France), but leaders avoided strongly endorsing Russia's one-year voluntary compliance proposal to not appear at odds with the US.
GLOBAL IMPLICATIONS
The expiration of New START on February 5, 2026, without renewal or a successor has created the first nuclear arms control vacuum between the US and Russia in over 50 years. This marks the end of verifiable limits on their strategic nuclear forces (which together comprise ~90% of the world's nuclear weapons) and removes key transparency/verification mechanisms. Experts across think tanks (RAND, SIPRI, FAS, Arms Control Association, etc.) describe it as ushering in heightened nuclear risks in an already tense geopolitical environment, though the full effects will unfold gradually rather than overnight.
Will It Spark or Accelerate an Arms Race?
Yes, it increases the likelihood of a renewed (or accelerated) nuclear arms race, but analysts emphasize it is more likely to be gradual, qualitative, and multipolar rather than an immediate Cold War-style sprint.
· US-Russia dynamics: Both sides have significant "upload" capacity (additional warheads that can be deployed on existing missiles/submarines/bombers relatively quickly). Without caps or inspections, worst-case planning will drive decisions. Russia could upload faster in the near term; the US is under domestic pressure (Congress, military) to expand for deterrence against both Russia and China. However, a full-scale quantitative race is not inevitable—some political commitments or informal understandings could limit near-term growth.
· China's role: Beijing's already-rapid expansion (hundreds to 1,000+ warheads by 2030) is now unconstrained by any framework. This creates a "two-nuclear-peer" challenge for the US, incentivizing US buildup, which in turn could prompt further Russian and Chinese responses. The result is a more complex triangular arms race involving emerging technologies (hypersonics, AI command systems, missile defenses, counter-space weapons).
· Broader effects: Other nuclear states (e.g., UK, France, India, Pakistan, North Korea) may adjust postures. Non-nuclear states could hedge or pursue proliferation if they see the major powers abandoning restraint.
Many experts note the race was already "gathering steam" due to modernization programs and tensions (Ukraine, Taiwan); the treaty's end simply removes the brakes and norms that had stabilized competition.
Does It Disturb the Global Balance of Power?
Yes, it shifts the nuclear balance toward greater multipolarity, uncertainty, and fragility—eroding the post-Cold War order without replacing it with new stabilizers.
· Strategic instability: Loss of data exchanges and dialogue channels increases miscalculation risks in crises (e.g., "launch on warning" pressures). Deterrence becomes "more brittle" without mutual restraint.
· Alliances and regional security: US allies (Europe, Indo-Pacific) face heightened risks; Europe is urged to pursue its own risk-reduction initiatives. In Asia, China's growth plus US-Russia competition could complicate deterrence (e.g., Australia’s strategic environment). Some allies (South Korea, Japan, Poland) have already floated nuclear hedging debates.
· Non-proliferation regime: The NPT's credibility is further damaged. Non-nuclear states argue the nuclear powers are violating Article VI (disarmament obligations), potentially fueling proliferation pressures in the Middle East, East Asia, or elsewhere. This could coincide with a global revival of civilian nuclear power (AI/data centers, climate goals).
· Russia-China alignment: An unconstrained environment may push Moscow and Beijing toward deeper nuclear coordination (e.g., early warning, targeting), complicating US planning.
Overall, the world moves from a rules-based (if imperfect) bilateral system to one of "unrestrained nuclear competition" with fewer guardrails, higher costs, and elevated escalation risks amid great-power rivalry.
Other Global Implications
· Higher nuclear use risk: UN Secretary-General called it a "grave moment" amid already-high tensions; arms control groups warn of moral and legal setbacks (disarmament obligations remain under international law).
· Economic/Policy Strain: US nuclear expansion would be costly and could divert resources from conventional forces or other priorities. Russia and China face their own constraints.
· Opportunity for Reset? Some view it as a chance for "modernized" trilateral talks (US push for China inclusion), but positions remain entrenched as of April 2026. Low-level strategic stability talks continue; Russia has signaled voluntary restraint, but no binding framework exists.
INDIA’S POSITION, CONCERNS AND IMPLICATIONS
India has not issued a high-profile official statement from the Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) directly reacting to the New START expiration on February 5, 2026. This is consistent with India's longstanding approach: it maintains strategic autonomy, avoids public entanglement in bilateral US-Russia arms control matters, and does not participate in formal nuclear arms limitation treaties as a non-NPT nuclear state.
Indian analysts, think tanks (such as ICWA, IDSA, and others), and media have discussed the implications extensively, framing the lapse as part of broader global nuclear instability that indirectly affects India's security environment.
India's Core Concerns
· China's unconstrained nuclear expansion: This is the primary worry. China's arsenal (estimated at 600+ warheads and growing rapidly) is not limited by any treaty. Without US-Russia caps or a trilateral framework that includes China, Beijing's buildup could accelerate, forcing India to reassess its own credible minimum deterrence posture. India currently maintains a smaller arsenal (around 180 warheads) and a No First Use (NFU) policy, but analysts note that growing asymmetry with China (and the two-front challenge with Pakistan) could strain NFU and prompt incremental modernization or adjustments.
· Regional ripple effects: The expiration risks a multipolar arms dynamic in Asia. An unchecked China could lead to qualitative or quantitative responses from India, potentially complicating border tensions (Ladakh etc.) and South Asian stability involving Pakistan. Some commentary suggests that if China were brought into future arms control (as the US advocates), it could indirectly ease pressure on India.
· Erosion of global norms: The end of the last major US-Russia restraint weakens the broader nuclear order, including the NPT's credibility. India, which has long criticized the NPT as discriminatory, views this as highlighting the need for more equitable discussions on arms control that go beyond the old bipolar framework.
India's Broader Position and Strategic Calculus
· Support for restraint and stability: India generally favors responsible nuclear behavior and risk reduction. In the past, it welcomed extensions of New START. Post-expiration, Indian commentary (e.g., in The Hindu) sees the lapse as an opportunity to rethink arms control on "wider and equal terms," moving away from the discriminatory NPT-era structures toward inclusive dialogues that reflect current realities (including rising powers like India and China).
· No interest in joining formal limits: Like other non-NPT states, India is expected to stay outside any new trilateral or multilateral quantitative caps. It prioritizes its own deterrence needs and has not signaled willingness to accept external restrictions on its arsenal.
· Focus on strategic autonomy: India continues modernizing its nuclear triad (land, sea, air) at a measured pace for minimum credible deterrence, while emphasizing dialogue, confidence-building, and peaceful resolution of disputes. It does not view the expiration as an immediate crisis but as a structural shift that requires careful monitoring and hedging.
Implications for India
Analysts describe India's position as a "strategic bind": it must absorb risks from a more unstable global nuclear environment without triggering its own destabilizing buildup. The lapse removes indirect stabilizing effects that New START had on major-power behavior, potentially making India's two-front deterrence calculus more complex. However, India retains flexibility due to its smaller arsenal and NFU doctrine (though some debate whether NFU remains sustainable long-term amid opacity and expansion by adversaries).
In summary, India's position is cautious and pragmatic — privately concerned about China's growth and global instability, publicly restrained, and focused on preserving its independent nuclear posture while advocating for more inclusive and equitable international nuclear discussions. As of April 2026, there has been no major shift or formal diplomatic intervention from New Delhi on this specific issue. The situation reinforces India's emphasis on self-reliant deterrence amid great-power competition.
PRACTISE QUESTIONS FOR GS – 2 MAINS
1. The expiration of the New START Treaty marks the end of verifiable nuclear arms control between the United States and Russia after five decades. Examine its implications for global strategic stability and nuclear non-proliferation.
2. In a multipolar nuclear world, bilateral arms control frameworks are increasingly inadequate. Critically analyse the US demand for including China in future nuclear arms control agreements.
3. Discuss the differing positions of the United States, Russia, and China on post-New START arms control negotiations. How do these positions reflect their strategic priorities?
4. The erosion of nuclear arms control regimes undermines the credibility of the global non-proliferation architecture. Evaluate this statement in the context of recent developments.
PRACTISE QUESTIONS FOR PSIR OPTIONAL
1. Analyse the end of the New START Treaty through the lens of Realism. Does it signal a return to classical balance-of-power politics in nuclear strategy?
2. Arms control agreements are instruments of strategic stability rather than disarmament. Critically evaluate this statement with reference to US-Russia nuclear relations.
3. Examine how the transition from a bipolar to a multipolar nuclear order complicates traditional arms control frameworks. Discuss with reference to US-Russia-China dynamics.
4. Discuss India’s “strategic autonomy” in the context of global nuclear instability. How does the end of New START create a “strategic bind” for India?
